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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
1
issued sixteen trademark decisions and designated nine of those
2
sixteen decisions as precedential. These cases consist of appeals
3
from the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB
4
or “the Board”) and federal district courts.
Of the nine precedential trademark decisions, six dealt with
5
primarily substantive issues while three involved primarily procedural

1. In re Sones, No. 2009-1140, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1118 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2009); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Dunmore Prop. S.A., No.
2009-1313, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2009); In re
1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 92
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding Inc.,
581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Inca Textiles, LLC,
No. 2008-1443, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 2, 2009); In re Bose
Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Cipriani Group,
Inc. v. Orient-Express Hotels Inc., 331 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam);
In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
In re Northland Organic Foods Corp., 337 F. App’x 878 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 335 F. App’x 966, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Bishop v. Flournoy, 319 F. App’x 897 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Aycock Eng’g, Inc.
v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Holt’s Co.
v. Virgin Enter. Ltd., 309 F. App’x 412 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
2. In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118;
1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682; Cold War Museum, 586
F.3d 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626; Vita-Mix Corp., 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1340; Bose, 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938; In re Hotels.com, 573
F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532; In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218; In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1489; Aycock Eng’g, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301.
3. In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, at *1, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119;
Am. Rice, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467, at *1; In re 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d at
1360–61, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682; Cold War Museum, 586 F.3d at 1354, 92
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627; In re Inca Textiles, LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656, at
*1; In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938; Cipriani Group,
Inc., 331 F. App’x at 749; In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1301, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1533; Northland Organic Foods Corp., 337 F. App’x at 878; In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop,
571 F.3d at 1172, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219; In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1349,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490; Bishop, 319 F. App’x at 897; Aycock Eng’g Inc., 560 F.3d
at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302; Holt’s Co., 309 F. App’x at 412.
4. Vita-Mix Corp., 581 F.3d at 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342; McZeal, 335
F. App’x at 966, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
5. In re 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682
(genericness); In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (fraud on
the trademark office); In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532
(genericness); In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218
(false association); Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks); Aycock Eng’g Inc., 560 F.3d 1350,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (use in commerce).
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6

issues. As is typical, the Federal Circuit largely adopted the findings
of the lower tribunals, affirming nine of the sixteen decisions on
7
appeal.
While the Federal Circuit largely affirmed the TTAB in 2009,
the court also redirected the Board in several decisions that, in effect,
8
eased the burden of trademark owners and the trademark bar.
9
In In re Bose Corp., the Federal Circuit held that a trademark owner
commits fraud on the Trademark Office when obtaining or
maintaining a registration only when the owner knowingly makes a
10
false, material representation with the intent to deceive the Office.
In contrast, the TTAB had been employing a lower, constructive
11
knowledge standard for finding fraud.
12
Also of note, in In re Sones, the Circuit loosened the validity
requirements for web-based specimens for goods, finding that
Internet specimens do not need to show a photograph of the goods
13
to be a valid specimen of use. Prior to the Circuit’s In re Sones
decision, the Trademark Office had been requiring trademark
applicants submitting web-based specimens to provide a photograph
of the goods wherein the goods are displayed in close proximity to
14
the applied-for mark and ordering information.

6. In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118
(statement of use requirements for web-based specimens for goods); Cold War
Museum, 586 F.3d 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (admissibility of prosecution file
evidence); Vita-Mix Corp., 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (common law
rights).
7. Am. Rice, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467, at *1; In re 1800Mattress.com, 586 F.3d
at 1361, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682; Inca Textiles, LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
19656, at *1; Cipriani Group, Inc., 331 F. App’x at 749; Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1301,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533; Northland Organic Foods Corp., 337 F. App’x at 878;
Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d at 1172, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219; Aycock Eng’g,
Inc., 560 F.3d at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302; Holt’s Co., 309 F. App’x at 412.
8. See, e.g., In re Sones, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, at *1, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1119 (weakening requirements for web-based specimens of use in commerce for
goods); Cold War Museum, 586 F.3d at 1356, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628
(mandating that a trademark prosecution record is automatically part of the record
in TTAB proceedings); In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1938 (raising the bar for finding fraud on the Trademark Office); In re Spirits Int’l,
563 F.3d at 1349, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (heightening the burden on the
Trademark Office to find a mark primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive); Bishop, 319 F. App’x at 900 (admissions against interest in a TTAB
proceeding might support standing to bring an opposition proceeding).
9. 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
10. Id. at 1244–45, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940–41.
11. Id. at 1244, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
12. No. 2009-1140, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2009).
13. Id. at *17, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
14. Id. at *7–12, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121–22.
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Each of the Federal Circuit’s 2009 trademark decisions are
discussed in detail below.
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Fraud on the Trademark Office
In perhaps the most stinging rebuke on the TTAB of 2009,
the Circuit censured the Board for overusing the f-word: fraud.
15
In In re Bose Corp., the Circuit reversed the Board’s decision finding
fraud on the Trademark Office based on an inaccurate registration
16
renewal document.
Bose Corporation, the maker of popular high-end electronics
equipment including the WAVE line that once encompassed audio
tape recorders and players, brought an opposition proceeding
against Hexawave, Inc.’s application for HEXAWAVE in connection
17
with various electronic goods.
Hexawave, Inc. counterclaimed that Bose was no longer making
audio tape recorders and players under the WAVE mark, and as such,
had committed fraud on the Trademark Office in 2001 when it
renewed its registration for WAVE in connection with audio tape
18
recorders and players.
The TTAB explicitly found that Bose stopped manufacturing audio
tape recorders and players in the late 1990s and that Bose’s general
counsel knew the company had stopped manufacture of these goods,
19
but still chose to sign the registration renewal (which asserts that the
20
mark is still in use for these goods). Because the TTAB held that
21
Bose had committed fraud, it voided Bose’s entire registration.
The Circuit began its opinion in In re Bose with a veritable homily
on trademark fraud jurisprudence. The court explained that a
moving party in cancellation proceedings must prove its fraud
22
charges “to the hilt,” with clear and convincing evidence. The court
further noted that fraud in renewal occurs when “an applicant
15. 580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
16. Id. at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
17. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39.
18. Id. at 1242–43, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
19. Bose argued that because customers still had their audio tape recorders and
players repaired by Bose, and because the repairs necessitated transport back and
forth to consumers, Bose’s General Counsel reasonably believed the goods were still
within the stream of interstate commerce, and accordingly no deception towards the
Office was intended. Id. at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
20. Id. at 1242, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
21. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
22. Id. at 1243, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
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knowingly makes false, material representations of fact in connection
23
Absent a showing of knowingly making
with his application.”
inaccurate
or
misleading
statements,
even
a
material
misrepresentation does not constitute fraud under the Trademark
24
Act warranting cancellation of the registration at issue. The Board
had largely (and correctly in the Circuit’s eyes) required a showing
that any deception effected on the Trademark Office was willful in
25
order to constitute fraud on the Office. The Circuit contrasted the
willful standard with a stricter standard requiring proof of intent or
specific intent to deceive before cancelling a trademark registration,
noting that five of the eleven circuits had required that a cancellation
movant provide evidence of specific intent to deceive the Trademark
26
Office. However, the court noted that the Board gradually began to
27
chip away at the higher standard of fraud to implement a lower,
23. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939 (citing Torres v. Cantine Torresella
S.r.l., 808 F.2d 46, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added).
24. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939–40 (citing King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy
Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 1011 n.4, 212 U.S.P.Q. 801, 803 n.4 (C.C.P.A.
1981)).
25. See id. at 1243, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940 (following “the statute and case
law, the Board had consistently and correctly acknowledged that there is a material
legal distinction between a false representation and a fraudulent one, the latter
involving an intent to deceive, whereas the former may be occasioned by a
misunderstanding, an inadvertence, a mere negligent omission, or the like” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
26. Id. at 1243–44, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
27. The Circuit chastised the Board for ignoring the “long line of precedents
from the Board itself, from [the Circuit], and from other circuit courts” requiring
specific intent to deceive in order to find fraudulent conduct in Medinol and the
post-Medinol cancellation proceedings. Id. at 1244, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940.
However, from whence was this lowered “should have known” standard born?
Although the Circuit in In re Bose dances around it, the Board based its Medinol
standard on the Circuit’s handling of Torres, 808 F.2d 46, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1483.
In Torres, a wine and spirits manufacturer had obtained a composite word and design
mark registration for use in connection with wine, vermouth, and champagne.
Id. at 47, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. The Registrant subsequently changed the
design element in its mark and stopped making sparkling wine and spirits under the
mark. Id., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. However, when the Registrant tried to
renew his registration, he submitted a sworn declaration with his renewal application
asserting that he was still using the original registered mark in connection with wine,
sparkling wine, and spirits, and as his specimen of use, he attached an old label
showing the registered mark as an example of how the mark was currently “in use in
interstate commerce.” Id. at 48, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. The Torres Circuit
iterated that when a trademark registrant files a verified renewal application stating
that a mark is currently in use when “he knows or should know that he is not using
the mark as registered . . . he has knowingly attempted to mislead the PTO.” Id. at
49, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
The Circuit asserted that the Board was ignoring the facts of the Torres case
because it was clear that the Torres registrant knew he was deceiving the PTO.
However, the Torres Court was not willing to concede that Torres fully appreciated
that his conduct was deceitful, hence the constructive knowledge language. The
reality is that many companies, even larger companies like Bose, handle trademark
prosecution and/or renewals in-house. The person signing registration maintenance
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constructive knowledge standard (simple negligence standard).
Specifically, in the Board’s 2003 decision in Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx,
28
Inc., the TTAB held that “[a] trademark applicant commits fraud in
procuring a registration when it makes material representations of
fact in its declaration which it knows or should know to be false or
29
misleading.”
The Circuit opined that “the principle that the standard for finding
intent to deceive is stricter than the standard for negligence or gross
negligence” in patent inequitable conduct cases is applicable to
30
trademark fraud cases.
Accordingly, the court held that
“a trademark is obtained fraudulently under the [Trademark] Act
only if the applicant or registrant knowingly makes a false, material
31
representation with the intent to deceive the [Trademark Office].”
The court further noted that “direct evidence of deceptive intent is
rarely available,” and thus allowed for inferring intent to deceive
32
from “indirect and circumstantial evidence.” However, the Circuit
took pains to remind the Board (and the trademark bar) that this
indirect and circumstantial evidence must still be “clear and
33
convincing” evidence.
34
Applying this holding to the In re Bose facts, the Circuit agreed
that Bose’s general counsel made false statements to the Trademark
Office by stating that the WAVE mark was still in use for audio tape
recorders and players despite his knowledge that Bose stopped
making those products four or five years before he filed the renewal
35
application. The Circuit, noting that Bose had not contested that

documents may be a non-lawyer, or like in In re Bose, a non-trademark lawyer who is
unfamiliar with the particularities of practice before the Trademark Office.
The Torres court and the TTAB seemed to signal a greater level of accountability for
companies making sworn statements before the Office, one that seems to comport
with the indefinite lifespan of trademark protection. It may be that the Board went
too far, but they had a little help from the Federal Circuit.
28. No. 92040535, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 227, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1205 (T.T.A.B.
2003), abrogated by DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Am. Motors Corp., No. 92045099,
2010 TTAB LEXIS 14 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
29. Id. at *13, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1209 (emphasis added).
30. In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1244, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
31. Id. at 1245, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. It is assumed that here the Circuit
means that fraud is effected when a trademark applicant obtains registration, or a
trademark owner maintains registration, by means of false, material representation(s)
made with the intent to deceive the Trademark Office.
32. Id. at 1245, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
33. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
34. The original appellee Hexawave did not appear and the court granted the
Office leave to stand in as the appellee in Circuit proceedings. Id. at 1243,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
35. Id. at 1246, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
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the statement was material, concluded that Bose had, in fact, made a
37
material misrepresentation to the Trademark Office.
The Circuit, however, pointed to the general counsel’s statement
“under oath” that he believed that the repairing of old WAVE audio
tape recorders and players and returning the repaired goods met the
“use in commerce” standard for trademark renewal at the time he
38
signed the renewal application.
The Circuit proclaimed that
“[u]nless the challenger [here the TTAB] can point to evidence to
support an inference of deceptive intent, it has failed to satisfy the
clear and convincing evidence standard required to establish a fraud
39
claim.”
Characterizing the general counsel’s behavior as “occasioned by an
honest misunderstanding or inadvertence,” the Circuit held that the
Board had erred in finding that Bose had committed fraud in its
renewal application and by subsequently cancelling the WAVE mark
40
in its entirety. The Circuit then remanded the case so that the
41
Board could restrict the registration’s covered goods to exclude
42
audio tape recorders and players.

36. It is quite interesting that the Circuit would take pains to point out that it
would not discuss materiality when Bose had not contested materiality. It seems
inarguable that stating the registered mark is in use for the goods as listed in the
registration certificate is a material statement. A statement that the mark is in use is
the raison d’etre of the renewal application and the registration. If the mark is not in
use, the Registrant cannot maintain registration, absent the filing and acceptance of
a declaration of excusable non-use. Excusable non-use does, however, occur in
limited circumstances. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(b)(2) (2006); Ex parte Kelley-HowThomson Co., 1958 WL 5895, 118 U.S.P.Q. 40 (Comm’r Patents June 24, 1958).
37. In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
38. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
39. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
40. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
41. Id. at 1247, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (“We agree with the Board,
however, that because the WAVE mark is no longer in use on audio tape recorders
and players, the registration needs to be restricted to reflect commercial reality.”).
42. Perhaps those rendering the greatest sighs of relief in the post-Bose world are
trademark practitioners with international clients who register their marks in the
United States based on foreign registrations or pursuant to the Madrid Protocol.
Foreign applicants often have registrations or Madrid applications for everything and
the kitchen sink. They are not required to submit any evidence that their marks are
actually in use prior to registration, but they do have to aver that they have a bona
fide intent to use the mark in commerce in the United States. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1126(e), 1141(5) (2006). Particularly with Madrid requests for extension of
protection, U.S. practitioners often handle these matters for foreign counsel, and
thus might not even correspond with the foreign “client” directly. As a result,
trademark prosecution attorneys in the United States are often not in the best
position to assess the veracity of a foreign client’s statements regarding whether
goods or services are being produced or provided under a given mark at the time of
registration or renewal.
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B. Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive Marks
43

In In re Spirits International, N.V., the Circuit vacated the Board’s
finding that the Applicant’s mark was primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive of the origin of the goods (vodka) and
44
remanded the case back to the TTAB for reconsideration.
Spirits International N.V. filed a trademark application for
MOSKOVSKAYA (of or from Moscow) in connection with vodka in
45
1993. The assigned Trademark Examining Attorney first examined
46
the mark under the doctrine of foreign equivalents. The doctrine
of foreign equivalents states that foreign language marks generally
must be translated into English to determine whether a mark
(1) is primarily merely descriptive, (2) presents a likelihood of
confusion with a registered mark, or (3) is primarily geographically
47
deceptively misdescriptive or geographically descriptive.
The Examining Attorney required a translation statement of the
MOSKOVSKAYA mark into English included in the record and
requested the applicant to indicate whether the applicant’s vodka
would be manufactured, produced, or sold in Moscow, or would have
48
any other connection to Moscow. The Applicant admitted “nyet”
under sworn declaration, and, in 2006, the Trademark Office denied
registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3), which prohibits the
registration of marks that are primarily geographically deceptively
49
misdescriptive of the goods.
In order to make a prima facie showing that an applied-for mark is
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, the Trademark
Office must show that:
(1) the mark’s primary significance is a generally known
geographic location; (2) the relevant public would be likely to
believe that the goods originate in the place named in the mark . . .
43. 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
44. Id. at 1349, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
45. Id. at 1349–50, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
46. Id. at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
47. See id. at 1351–52, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491–92 (citing 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:34 (4th ed.
2009) (“Under the ‘doctrine of foreign equivalents,’ foreign words from common
languages are translated into English . . . .”); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1689,
1696 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re N. Paper Mills, 64 F.2d 998, 998–99, 17 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
492, 493 (C.C.P.A. 1933).
48. In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
49. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. The Applicant’s registration was
suspended for twelve years, while the Trademark Office disposed of third-party
applications that the Office felt might bar applicant’s mark from registering pursuant
to section 2(d) of the Trademark Act as confusingly similar marks. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1490.
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when in fact the goods do not come from that place; and (3) that
the misrepresentation is a material factor in the consumer’s
decision.50

On appeal to the Board, Spirits proffered a mall-intercept survey
and argued that the survey demonstrated that “the meaning of the
mark is arbitrary because the term would not be translated into
English by consumers, and that its geographic meaning would be lost
51
on the public.”
The TTAB applied the doctrine of foreign equivalents and noted
the translation of the MOSKOVSKAYA mark into English was “of or
from Moscow,” satisfying the first prong of the primarily
52
geographically deceptively misdescriptive test. The Board accepted
the evidence proffered by the Examining Attorney that Moscow is
53
famous for vodka, satisfying the second prong of the test. Finally,
the Board concluded that the Examining Attorney had met his
burden as to the third prong by submitting evidence that Moscow was
famous for high-quality vodka to the extent that the public would be
materially influenced to purchase applicant’s vodka by virtue of the
54
MOSKOVSKAYA mark.
The Board noted that the United States has approximately 706,000
Russian speakers and concluded that at least one significant group of
Americans would—upon viewing the MOSKOVSKAYA mark—
perceive a connection to Moscow and its storied vodka tradition and
be influenced in their purchasing decision by virtue of the “Moscow”
55
connotation. After faulting the Applicant’s mall-intercept survey for
failing to include Russian speakers, the TTAB found that the
Examining Attorney had met his burden under the primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive test and affirmed the
56
refusal to register.
The Circuit roundly rejected the Board’s decision. First, the court
reminded the Board that the doctrine of foreign equivalents is not an
absolute; that is, some marks would not be translated from the
foreign language into English because they have established
alternative meanings (e.g., “Cordon Bleu” for the famous culinary

50. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490–91.
51. In re Spirits Int’l N.V., No. 74382759, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 6, at *9,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1078, 1081 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
52. In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
53. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
54. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
55. Id. at 1351, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
56. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
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57

school) or because the language is so rare. Of course, if consumers
would not stop and translate “MOSKOVSKAYA,” then the primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive specter would never be
58
raised.
Next, the Circuit essentially said that the Board did not understand
the primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive test provision
59
of the Trademark Act and set about correcting them.
Section
2(e)(3) was added to the Lanham Act by the North American Free
60
Prior to NAFTA,
Trade (NAFTA) Implementation Act in 1993.
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks were
analyzed pursuant to Trademark Act section 2(e)(2), the provision
61
that deals with geographically descriptive marks.
Under section
2(e)(2), there is no requirement that the Trademark Office evidence
that a customer’s purchasing decision is materially affected by the
62
geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark. Under the “new”
section 2(e)(3) provision, geographically deceptively misdescriptive
marks are treated like deceptive marks pursuant to Trademark Act
section 2(a); accordingly, the Trademark Office must show that the
deception effected by the mark is material—that consumers are more
likely to purchase something because they believe it be from the
63
geographic location referenced.
The Circuit, acknowledging that it had not spelled out the criteria
for materiality in its post-NAFTA decisions, opined that materiality
under section 2(e)(3) requires the Trademark Office to show first,
that “a substantial portion of the relevant consumers” be deceived,
and second, that because of this deception, those consumers would
64
be influenced in their purchasing decision. The court found that

57. Id. at 1352, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (citing Cont’l Nut Co. v. Cordon
Bleu, 494 F.2d 1397, 1398, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647, 648 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Tia
Maria, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524, 525–26 (T.T.A.B. 1975)).
58. In other words, if the average consumer would not stop and make the
connection between “MOSKOVSKAYA” and “Moscow,” then the Applicant’s mark is
not capable of deceiving the consumer by purporting a connection between
Applicant’s vodka and Moscow.
59. In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1352–55, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492–94.
60. Id. at 1352, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
61. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
62. Id. at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
63. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. Of course, the Board asserted that it did
apply this test, it just agreed with the Examining Attorney’s take on the matter, that
is, that consumers would be more likely to purchase vodka coming from Moscow,
Russia, than, say, Peoria, Illinois.
64. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493; see also id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493
(noting that the governing case on primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks, In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2003), “did not address the question of whether the
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the TTAB erred in not considering this proportionality in its
determination that the deception would be material in the relevant
65
consumers’ purchasing decisions. The court seemed to imply that
the Board may have framed the class of relevant consumers too
narrowly, and thus too hastily concluded that deception would
66
occur. Accordingly, the Circuit remanded to the TTAB to consider
whether a “substantial portion of the relevant consumers would be
materially influenced in the decision to purchase the product or
67
service by the geographic meaning of the mark.”
C. Genericness
The Federal Circuit addressed two cases regarding refusals of
68
registration based on genericness in 2009. In In re 1800Mattress.com,
the Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision upholding a generic refusal
of the mark MATTRESS.COM on the Supplemental Register for
“online retail store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and
69
bedding.”
materiality test of subsection (e)(3) embodies a requirement that a significant
portion of the relevant consumers be deceived”).
65. Id. at 1357, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
66. See id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496 (“The problem with the Board’s
decision is that it elsewhere rejected a requirement of proportionality, and discussed
instead the fact that Russian is a ‘common, modern language[] of the world [that]
will be spoken or understood by an appreciable number of U.S. consumers for the
product or service at issue,’” but “failed to consider whether Russian speakers were a
‘substantial portion of the intended audience’”).
67. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495–96. It is curious that the court did not take
the Board to task for affirming a decision based on an inapposite test.
The Applicant’s goods are vodka, a spirit. Applicant’s application is based on intentto-use, and accordingly, his application should have been refused pursuant to section
2(a)’s prohibition on the registration of a designation that includes “a geographical
indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a
place other than the origin of the goods.”
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).
The Examining Attorney should have refused registration not under the “deceptive”
prong of section 2(a) or under the primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive prong of section 2(e)(3), but under the deceptive “geographical
indication” portion of section 2(a). See USPTO Trademark Examination Guide 1-06,
Geographical Indications Used on Wines and Spirits (May 9, 2006),
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/exam/examguide1-06.jsp (last visited
Apr. 7, 2010) (noting that if a section 2(a) “wines and spirits” refusal is issued, then
section 2(a) deceptive and section 2(e)(3) refusals are not necessary).
According to the Circuit, a rejection under either prong would distill to the same
test. In re Spirits Int’l, 563 F.3d at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493 (“The ‘addition
of a materiality inquiry [to subsection (e)(3)] equates this test with the elevated
standard applied under section 1052(a)’ . . . . Since the NAFTA Act, the
deceptiveness of the mark must be material under subsection (e)(3) just as it is
under subsection (a).” (internal citations omitted)). However, if the Circuit were
going to remand, it is curious that they did not direct the office to analyze the case
under the proper section of the Trademark Act.
68. 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
69. Id. at 1361, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
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Dial-A-Mattress, 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC’s predecessor-ininterest, began its attempt to register MATTRESS.COM in
connection with “online retail store services in the field of mattresses,
70
beds, and bedding” in 2005.
More than two years later, the
Trademark Office “finally” refused registration pursuant to section
71
23(c) of the Trademark Act on the basis of genericness. Dial-AMattress appealed to the TTAB who affirmed the Office’s findings,
noting that “mattress” identified the very nature of Applicant’s
business—selling mattresses—and that the juxtaposition of “mattress”
72
and “.com” did not yield a registrable, non-generic whole.
Not surprisingly, the Board was not lulled by the Applicant’s
argument that the “.com” in MATTRESS.COM called forth
connotations of “comfort” or “comfortable” for the relevant
73
purchasing public rather than a domain name extension.
On appeal, the Applicant further argued that MATTRESS.COM
may be generic for “online mattress stores,” but that the record
contained no evidence that MATTRESS.COM is generic for “online
retail store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding,”
74
the identified services of record. Moreover, the Applicant argued
that because brick and mortar mattress establishments also used
“mattress.com” in their domain names, the applied-for mark was not
75
generic.
As the Circuit noted, an applied-for mark is considered generic if
relevant consumers use the mark to refer to the general kind or
genus of goods or services with which the Applicant seeks
76
protection. Thus, to assess genericness one must conduct a two-step
inquiry: (1) What is the general kind of goods or services at issue in
the case at bar?; and (2) Is the applied-for mark understood by the
general public to refer to the general kinds of goods or services at
77
bar? Here, the court concluded that mattresses are the goods being
sold by Applicant, and the mattress-consuming public would view

70. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
71. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682.
72. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682–83.
73. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
74. Id. at 1362, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
75. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683–84.
76. Id. at 1362–63, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684 (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v.
Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989–90, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528, 530
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).
77. Id. at 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
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MATTRESS.COM as “no more than the sum of its constituent
78
parts.”
Accordingly, the Circuit found that 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC had
submitted no evidence to support its theory that consumers view
“.com” as shorthand for comfort or comfortable, such that the
addition of “.com” to “mattress” effected a registrable, non-generic
79
term. As such, the Circuit affirmed the Board’s refusal to register
80
MATTRESS.COM .
81
In In re Hotels.com (Hotels.com III), the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board’s decision finding HOTELS.COM to be generic for Applicant’s
travel-related services.
The Applicant, Hotels.com, L.P., a popular online booking agent,
82
continued its crusade to register its HOTELS.COM mark, here in
standard characters, in connection with “making reservations and
83
The Trademark
bookings for temporary lodging for others.”
Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s attempt to register the mark
registered pursuant to a claim of acquired distinctiveness under
84
Lanham Act section 2(f). Moreover, the Examining Attorney issued
a warning that the mark appeared to be generic for the services at
85
issue, inter alia, booking hotels for others.
On appeal, the TTAB took the unusual step of finding that the
mark was generic, but simultaneously finding that the evidence
submitted in support of acquired distinctiveness, while flawed, was

78. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. The Applicant did not contest that
“mattress” and “.com” were generic terms. The Applicant’s ultimately unsuccessful
argument was that the marriage of “mattress” and “.com” created a subjective
compound phrase. Cf. id. at 1362, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (“[A]ccording to
the PTO . . . the separate terms ‘mattress’ and ‘.com’ in combination have a meaning
identical to the common meaning of the separate components.”).
79. Id. at 1364, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
80. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
81. 573 F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
82. As noted in the Board decision, the issues in the current standard character
mark application were the subject of a prior Board decision regarding Hotels.com,
L.P.’s previous application for a mark comprising “HOTELS.COM” and a bellboy
design element. In re Hotels.com, L.P. (Hotels.com II), No. 78277681, 2008 TTAB
LEXIS 60, at *2–3, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1100, 1102 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2008) (citing
In re Hotels.com, L.P. (Hotels.com I), No. 76414272 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 11, 2006) (not
precedential), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/
other/2006/76414272.pdf. In the composite mark decision, the Board upheld the
Trademark Office’s requirement that Hotels.com, L.P. disclaim the “generic” literal
matter “HOTELS.COM.” Hotels.com I, No. 76414272, at 32. Hotels.com, L.P., did not
appeal the Board’s first decision, and eventually complied with the disclaimer
requirement allowing the applied-for mark to register on the Principal Register.
Hotels.com II, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *2–4, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101–02.
83. Hotels.com III, 573 F.3d at 1301, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
84. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
85. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
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substantial enough to support the section 2(f) claim. The Board
asserted that if the Applicant were to prevail on appeal to the Circuit
on the issue of genericness, the evidence of acquired distinctiveness
87
was sufficient.
The Applicant argued that hotel chains, not the Applicant, provide
lodging and meals to the Applicant’s customers; there is, thus, an
additional mental step at play, making the mark a non-generic term
88
in connection with the stated services.
Moreover, the Applicant
asserted that the fusion of “HOTELS” with “.COM” creates a
non-generic whole that, coupled with the survey evidence and sworn
89
declarations introduced on appeal clearly indicates that the mark
90
functions as a source indicator for Applicant’s services.
The TTAB relied on sundry definitions of the term of “HOTEL,”
websites of third-party entities offering hotel services, printouts from
Applicant’s website evidencing that Applicant helped its customers
91
find “hotels,” and third-party usage of “hotel” domain names. The
Board asserted that because “hotels” are the focus of Applicant
services, and because “.com” is a generic suffix that signifies an online
commercial presence, the aggregate expression “HOTELS.COM” has
92
“the same [generic] meaning as the word ‘hotels’ by itself.”
The court agreed with the Board that “the generic term ‘hotels’
did not lose its generic character by placement in the domain name
93
HOTELS.COM.”
Additionally, the Circuit found that the Board

86. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
87. This would seem impossible. Most issues of genericness revolve around
marks that teeter perilously on the brink between highly descriptive and purely
generic. The Board takes the position that HOTELS.COM is generic, and thus, not
capable of functioning as a trade or service mark. At the same time, they seem to be
saying that if the Circuit thinks the mark falls on the highly descriptive side, the mark
can be registered pursuant to section 2(f). However, highly descriptive marks have a
justifiably high hurdle to jump to establish acquired distinctiveness. The Board
sharply attacked the nature and quantity of the evidence presented by the Applicant
in support of its section 2(f) claim. How can they then say that the evidence is
substantial enough to allow registration on the Principal Register?
88. See Hotels.com III, 573 F.3d at 1301, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (arguing
that “the mark is not generic because the website HOTELS.COM does not provide
lodging and meals for its users and is not synonymous with the word ‘hotel’”).
89. The Circuit did chastise the Board for its apparently “unwarranted”
“total rejection” of Applicant’s rebuttal evidence, but found that the Board’s
disregard of this evidence did not “negate the TTAB’s ultimate conclusion.”
Id. at 1305, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536.
90. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
91. Id. at 1303, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
92. Id. at 1304, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
93. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535 (citing In re Reed Elsevier Prop., Inc.,
482 F.3d 1376, 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that
LAWYERS.COM is generic for an online database providing information for and
about lawyers)).
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reasonably gave controlling weight to the large number of similar
usages of “hotel” domain names as well as common meaning and
dictionary evidence that “hotels” and “.com” are generic terms, and
94
that the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.
D. Likelihood of Confusion
Two of the Circuit’s 2009 trademark law decisions considered
appeals involving refusals to register based on likelihood of
confusion, and in both cases, the Circuit agreed with the Board.
95
In In re Northland Organic Foods Corp., the Circuit affirmed the
Board’s decision upholding the Trademark Office’s partial refusal to
register the Applicant’s mark in certain international classes of goods
96
and services.
Applicant Northland Organic Foods Corp. sought registration of
the mark SEED TO PLATE and the associated design for sundry
97
goods and services. The Trademark Office refused registration as to
International Classes 16, 42, and 44 pursuant to section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, finding a likelihood of confusion with Trademark
Registration No. 3,047,968 for SEED TO PLATE A COMMUNITY
98
PARTNERSHIP IN CARING.
To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists between an
applied-for mark and a registered mark, the TTAB applied the
99
criteria established in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. The TTAB
affirmed the Office’s decision, finding that the marks were
confusingly similar because “SEED TO PLATE” is the dominant
94. Id. at 1305–06, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.
95. 337 F. App’x 878 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
96. Id. at 879.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The
criteria include: “(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. (2) The similarity
or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use. (3) The similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels. (4) The conditions
under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., “impulse” vs. careful,
sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length
of use). (6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion. (8) The length of time during
and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of
actual confusion. (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house
mark, ‘family mark,’ product mark). (10) The market interface between applicant
and the owner of a prior mark . . . . (11) The extent to which applicant has a right to
exclude others from use of its mark on its goods. (12) The extent of potential
confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial. (13) Any other established fact
probative of the effect of use.” Id., 177 U.S.P.Q. at 567. The TTAB is not required to
analyze all of the DuPont factors in every case. Id. at 1361–62.
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literal matter in both the applied-for and registered marks, and that
the parties’ goods and services were related based on third-party
registrations of record, evidencing that “numerous entities” provided
“books, magazines, educational services, and information services”
100
under the same mark.
Additionally, the TTAB found that
Registrant’s identified services of “planting, growing, and harvesting
crops” served the same class of purchasers via the same channels of
101
trade as Northland’s consumers.
On appeal, Northland did not contest that the parties’ goods and
services were related or that the trade channels and classes of
102
customers overlapped.
Instead, Northland argued that the
marks were actually very different, and that the TTAB erred by:
(1) ignoring the differing design elements present in the applied-for
and registered marks; and (2) giving no weight to the additional
wording present in the registered mark, A COMMUNITY
103
PARTNERSHIP IN CARING.
The Circuit reiterated the long-standing principle that in
considering the commercial impression of a mark—although all
features of a mark must be considered—one feature may be more
dominant than other features and thus may be accorded more
104
Typically, the literal portion of a mark is treated as more
weight.
105
dominant than any design matter in a composite mark.
Similarly,
non-descriptive wording is treated as more significant than any
106
descriptive or generic wording present in a compound mark.
According to the Circuit, it is “not necessary for the commercial
impressions to be identical in order to sustain a finding of likelihood

100. In re Northland, 337 F. App’x at 880.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 882. Northland waxed poetically that the registered mark “creates the
impression of a community who comes together to grow its own food as a result of
the use of an image of a man and a woman tending a garden along with the words
‘A Community Partnership in Caring,’” whereas the applied-for mark “creates the
impression that the food hat is placed on one’s plate will be of the highest quality
due to [Northland’s] fastidious supervision of the production cycle from its earliest
stage when the food one [sic] the plate was merely a seed.” Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 881 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d
1565, 1570, 218 U.S.P. Q. (BNA) 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
105. See In re Appetito Provisions Co., No. 423,405, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 47, at *1, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1553–54 (T.T.A.B. July 1, 1987) (remarking that consumers
are more likely to remember the word element of the mark APPETITO than the
related design elements).
106. See In re J.M. Originals Inc., No. 530,739, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 21, at *3–5,
6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1393, 1394 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 1987) (indicating that the
likelihood of confusion analysis should not turn on common, descriptive wording,
particularly when such wording has been disclaimed by the applicant).
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107

of confusion.” Thus, “[i]n view of the identity of the words of the
[dominant portion] of the marks,” the Board’s finding, uncontested
by Northland, that the parties’ goods and services are related, and the
determination that their trade channels and customers overlap,
the court found that the Board did not err in partially refusing
registration based on a likelihood of confusion with the registered
108
mark.
109
In In re Inca Textiles, the Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision
upholding the Trademark Office’s refusal to register Applicant’s
110
mark INCA MAMA.
Inca Textiles, LLC sought registration of the mark INCA MAMA in
111
The Trademark
connection with, inter alia, maternity clothing.
Office refused registration pursuant to Lanham Act section 2(d),
asserting a likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration
No. 2735016 for INCA GIRL and the associated design for sundry
112
articles of clothing.
The Trademark Examining Attorney argued
that the marks were similar because INCA is the dominant literal
portion in both the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the
goods are highly related because clothing manufacturers frequently
produce both maternity and nonmaternity wear, and that maternity
and nonmaternity wear are often sold in the same retail
113
establishments.
On appeal to the Circuit, the Applicant argued that the Board
114
Specifically, Inca
improperly dissected the registered mark.
Textiles argued that because the wording INCA GIRL appears in
small lettering above the female design element’s head and on her
shirt, the word portion of the mark is likely to be seen as the female
115
character’s name and not a source-identifier.
The Applicant
further argued that the TTAB erred in ruling that the parties’ goods
were closely related, noting that the Nice Agreement for classification
of trademarks, to which the United States is a party, lists clothing and
116
Finally, the Applicant
maternity clothing as separate categories.
argued that the trade channels were not similar because, in their
107. In re Northland, 337 F. App’x at 882 (citing In re Research & Trading Corp.,
793 F.2d 1276, 1278, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
108. Id.
109. No. 2008-1443, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 2, 2009).
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *1–2.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *5–6.
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(unsupported) estimation, consumers do not purchase maternity
117
wear online.
The Circuit noted that doubts as to the likelihood of confusion
between two marks should be resolved in favor of the prior user of
118
the mark. The court further noted that “classification [of the goods
or services in an application or cited registration] is wholly irrelevant
119
to the issue of registrability.” The court found that the Board had
120
properly “considered the cited mark in its entirety” and that it did
not commit reversible error in opining that “maternity clothing is
sufficiently similar to women’s clothing in general” as to engender
121
source confusion when sold in the same retail environment.
Finally, avoiding addressing the Applicant’s bald assertion that
pregnant women and their loved ones do not shop for maternity
clothing online, the Circuit pointed to third-party registrations for
brick and mortar stores selling both maternity and nonmaternity
wear as evidence that Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods swim in the
122
same trade channels.
E. False Association
123

In In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, the Circuit affirmed the Board’s
decision upholding the Trademark Office’s section 2(a) false
association refusal of Applicant’s applications for marks comprising
the word SHINNECOCK and design elements pursuant to section
124
2(a).
The Board agreed with the Trademark Examining Attorney
that the Applicant’s marks falsely suggested a connection with the
125
Shinnecock Nation.
117. Id. at *7.
118. Id. at *4 (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261,
1265, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
119. Id. at *6 (citing Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, 9 F.3d 971, 975, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
120. Id. at *5. The court also noted that the TTAB had “observed that in some of
the appearances of INCA GIRL only the words were shown in association with
women’s clothing.” Id. The Board also concluded that there is a likelihood of
confusion as to the source of the goods bearing the marks INCA MAMA and INCA
GIRL, with or without the design. Id. at *7.
This conclusion seems overstated.
After all, the INCA MAMA mark is registered with a rather elaborate design element.
How can the TTAB rule on likelihood of confusion with a mark that is not before
them? The crux of its argument is really that the words dominate the design
element, which is a long-standing general principle in trademark law. In re Appetito
Provisions Co., No. 423,405, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 47, at *3, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553,
1554 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
121. In re Inca Textiles, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19656, at *6.
122. Id. at *7.
123. 571 F.3d 1171, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
124. Id. at 1172, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
125. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
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Jonathan K. Smith, an on–reservation member of the Shinnecock
Indian Nation and sole proprietor of the Shinnecock Smoke Shop,
filed two trademark applications for SHINNECOCK and differing
126
designs in connection with cigarettes.
The Trademark Office
refused registration on the grounds that Smith’s use of the
Shinnecock name falsely suggested a connection between Smith’s
cigarettes and Smith’s tribe, the Shinnecock Indian Nation of eastern
127
Long Island, New York.
Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act bars, inter alia, the registration
of a mark that consists of or comprises matter that may falsely suggest
a connection with a person or entity, such as an Indian tribe, or
128
institution.
To succeed on a claim that a given trademark violates
section 2(a)’s prohibition on false suggestion of connection, the
Trademark Office (or an opposing party in an inter partes proceeding)
must establish the following:
(1) [T]hat the mark [at issue] is the same as, or a close
approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another
person or institution; (2) [that] the mark would be recognized as
such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or
institution; (3) [that] the person or institution named by the mark
is not connected with the activities performed by applicant under
the mark; and (4) [that] the fame or reputation of the person or
institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s

126. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
127. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006); see In re White, No. 78175476, 2004 WL 2202268,
at *1, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1715 (T.T.A.B. 2004) (refusing to register
APACHE for use in connection with cigarettes because the name falsely suggested a
connection with Apache tribes). Generally, the hot topic involving section 2(a)
disparagement claims and Indian tribes centers around challenging trademark
protections for sports teams’ marks that appropriate Native American names and
imagery in a manner that many consider to be offensive or disparaging. See Harjo v.
Pro-Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 284
F. Supp. 2d 96, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d, 415 F.3d 44, 75
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam), motion for summary judgment
granted, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1891 (BNA) (D.D.C. 2008), affirmed in
part, 565 F.3d 880, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1593 (BNA) (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
631 (2009). Although the TTAB initially granted Harjo’s petition for cancellation of
Pro-Football’s REDSKINS and REDSKINETTES trademark registrations on
disparagement grounds under section 2(a), id. at 1749, the district court for the
District of Columbia reversed the TTAB, holding that the doctrine of laches barred
Harjo’s claims because she had waited eight years past the age of majority to file for
cancellation. Pro-Football v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 145. The district court’s
decision led to a series of appeals that address the laches issue, but the
disparagement question did not reach the Federal Circuit.
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goods or services, a connection with the person or institution
129
would be presumed.

The Board asserted that the Shinnecock Indian Nation “has been a
130
state–recognized tribe for over 200 years”; (2) that the wording
SHINNECOCK has no other significance than as the name of the
tribe; and that mere membership in a tribe or even the tribe’s
awareness of Smith’s marketing of the cigarettes under the
131
Shinnecock name was not enough to obviate a section 2(a) refusal.
To overcome a false association refusal, Smith needed to demonstrate
that the Shinnecock Nation endorsed or sponsored the sale of his
132
cigarettes, not merely that they were aware of it. Finally, the TTAB
opined that the Shinnecock Indian Nation and its Shinnecock name
are well-known and that “[because] Indian tribes, in general, are
known to manufacture and market cigarettes,” consumers of Smith’s
Shinnecock cigarettes were likely to “mistakenly presume the
existence of a commercial connection between [Smith’s] cigarettes
133
and the Shinnecock tribe.”
In support of his opposition to the section 2(a) refusal, Smith
introduced a creative but ultimately ill-fated argument that, because
the U.S. Trademark Register is replete with registrations for marks
owned by non-Indians containing tribal names or the names of
134
famous Indians, the Trademark Office’s refusal of his Shinnecock
cigarette applications constituted racial discrimination in violation of
Smith’s constitutional due process and equal protection rights under
135
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The TTAB quickly
disposed of Smith’s discrimination claim, reasoning that the
existence of registrations for marks containing Indian names was
either because the goods or services in question were not those that
consumers were likely to believe the tribe would provide, or because

129. In re White, 2004 WL 2202268, at *6, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718; In re
Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., No. 74345270, 1997 WL 424966, at *3,
43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350, 1353 (T.T.A.B. 1997).
130. In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, No. 78918061, 2008 WL 4354159, at *4
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 10, 2008).
131. Id. at *4–5.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *7; see, e.g., U.S. Reg. No. 1447929 (using the mark SHINNECOCK
HILLS GOLF CLUB for country club and restaurant services); U.S. Reg. No. 2739914
(registering the mark 1891 SHINNECOCK for golf clothing and equipment);
U.S. Reg. No. 2417630 (registering the mark TUSCARORA for cigars); U.S. Reg.
No. 2396499 (using the mark CAYUGA for fishing reels); U.S. Reg. No. 2274143
(using the mark GERONIMO for tobacco leaves); and U.S. Reg. No. 2968623
(having the mark CRAZY HORSE for cigarettes).
135. In re Shinnecock, 2008 WL 4354159, at *5.
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the Office had erred in allowing registration of the applied-for marks,
136
and not because of racial bias.
On appeal to the Circuit, the Applicant did not contest that his
marks falsely suggested a connection with the Shinnecock tribe,
but instead contested whether the tribe was “an institution” pursuant
137
to section 2(a) of the Trademark Act.
He further repeated his
arguments of racial discrimination and equal protection violations by
138
the Trademark Office. The Circuit did not give weight to either of
these arguments and found that the Board did not err in affirming
the Examining Attorney’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
139
denying registration.”
With respect to the Trademark Office’s allowance of other
SHINNECOCK marks on the trademark register, the Circuit asserted
that even if the applicant were correct and the marks were registered
in contravention of section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, “[i]t does not
follow that the proper remedy for such mischief is to grant
140
Applicant’s marks.”
F. Use in Commerce
141

In Aycock Engineering Inc. v. Airflite Inc., a majority of the Circuit
panel affirmed the TTAB’s decision cancelling Aycock Engineering’s
142
service mark registration for failure to use the mark in commerce.
William Aycock was a man with a dream: chartering flights for
passengers who wished to travel by air taxi. He conceived of his
143
144
middleman service in the late 1940s and christened it “Airflite.”
At that time, he believed he would need at least 300 participating air
145
taxi operators to make his dream a reality.
In the mid-1960s, he
formed Aycock Engineering, Inc., and in 1970, he advertised his
air-taxi-operator network to Federal Aviation Administration-certified
air taxi pilots, some of whom entered into agreements with Aycock to
136. Id. at *7 (“The fact that . . . some marks have been registered . . . in violation
of the governing statutory standard does not mean that the [Patent and Trademark
Office] must forgo applying the standard in all other cases.” (quoting In re Boulevard
Entm’t Inc., 338 F.3d 1336, 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
2003))).
137. In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1173, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1218, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
138. Id. at 1174, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220–21.
139. Id. at 1174–75, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
140. Id. at 1175, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221.
141. 560 F.3d 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
142. Id. at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
143. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
144. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
145. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
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146

provide air taxi services. That same year, Aycock applied to register
the AIRFLITE mark with the Trademark Office. The mark matured
147
into registration on the Supplemental Register in 1974.
Unfortunately, Aycock could not make his AIRFLITE service fly.
Throughout the history of Aycock Engineering, he was never able to
keep more than twelve contracted pilots at a time. More importantly,
he never advertised his AIRFLITE services to the general public and
148
thus never arranged for air taxi transport for a single passenger.
Still, Mr. Aycock maintained his service mark, which he renewed in
149
1994.
In 2001, however, Airflite, Inc. grounded Aycock’s dream
through a cancellation proceeding in which Airflite argued that
Aycock had not truly used his AIRFLITE mark in commerce prior to
150
registration.
The Board agreed with Airflite, and cancelled
151
Mr. Aycock’s AIRFLITE registration.
On appeal, the Circuit began by analyzing the services for which
Aycock had registered the AIRFLITE mark to determine if the mark
152
had been used in commerce pursuant to the statute. The Circuit,
like the Board, held that Aycock’s services were “limited to
regulating, coordinating, operating, or administering a system to
153
book flights on airplanes.”
Under section 45 of the Trademark Act, service marks satisfy the
“use in commerce” requirement when: (1) a mark is “used or
displayed in the sale or advertising of services” and (2) either (i) “the
services are “rendered in commerce” or (ii) “the services are
rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a
foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in
154
commerce in connection with the services.”
When a registered
155
mark does not satisfy this use requirement, it is void ab initio.

146. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
147. Id. at 1354, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
148. Aycock had also registered two toll-free numbers for use by the public, but
there was no evidence that these numbers were ever used or that Aycock ever spoke
to a potential passenger about making a reservation. Id. at 1361, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1308–09.
149. Id. at 1354, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
150. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
151. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
152. See id. at 1355, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (“A prerequisite to deciding the
use requirement issue . . . involves defining the recitation of services in the
application.”).
153. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
155. Aycock, 560 F.3d at 1357, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305 (citing Gay Toys, Inc.
v. McDonald’s Corp., 585 F.2d 1067, 1068, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 722, 723 (C.C.P.A.
1978)).

2010]

2009 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

1137

Aycock argued that setting up the network was sufficient to comply
156
The Circuit deemed
with the use in commerce requirement.
Aycock’s efforts to put the AIRFLITE dream in flight mere
157
“preparatory stages” of a service’s development and stated that,
absent a showing that the services were actually offered to the public,
158
the use in commerce requirement could not be met. Accordingly,
159
the court affirmed the Board’s cancellation of Aycock’s mark.
160
Judge Newman passionately defended Aycock’s predicament.
She argued that the Trademark Office had crafted Aycock’s
recitation of services based on Aycock’s description of his services
during prosecution, the specimens of use submitted with his
application, and the recitation of services as mandated by the
161
Examining Attorney. Noting that Aycock acquiesced in the final
recitation of services after many exchanges with the Trademark
Office, Judge Newman concluded that “[i]f indeed a flaw in the
162
registration is now discovered, after thirty-five years, it should be
163
Judge Newman
clarified and corrected, not voided ab initio.”
determined that the issue of whether the recruitment of air taxi
operators constitutes a “registrable service” was improperly
considered by the Board because it was not raised in the cancellation
164
proceeding and was not briefed by either party.
Finally, Judge
Newman asserted that “the service of recruiting air taxi operators and
156. Id. at 1355, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
157. See id. at 1361, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 (“That Mr. Aycock advertised to,
contracted with, and was paid by air taxi operators does not transform the service
from its preparatory stages to being rendered in commerce. Instead, these actions
were Mr. Aycock’s attempts to build the service’s infrastructure, which, when
completed, could then be offered to the public (and thus ‘rendered in
commerce’).”).
158. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
159. Id. at 1362, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. The court, however, did not
address Airflite, Inc.’s abandonment and fraud claims. See id. at 1354 n.5,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 n.5 (stating that the TTAB declined to rule on the
issues of abandonment and fraud claims since it cancelled the AIRFLITE mark).
160. See id. at 1362, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“The cancellation of this long-standing registration is seriously flawed, and is
seriously unjust.”).
161. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309.
162. The majority opinion also expressed some regret for Aycock and his lost
dream. See id. at 1362 n.12, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309 n.12 (majority opinion)
(“We find it unfortunate that Mr. Aycock lost his AIRFLITE service mark after the
USPTO granted him a registration over thirty years ago. But under the federal
trademark and service mark registration system, no period of years exists beyond
which a mark holder becomes immune from invalidation under the use
requirement.”). The Aycock majority suggested that Aycock might find some shelter
from this “harsh reality” under common law trademark doctrine. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1309 n.12.
163. Id. at 1362, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (Newman, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1363, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
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contracting with them is indeed a registrable service[,]” and
therefore “Aycock was not engaging in advance publicity, but was
165
performing the registered service.”
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Admissibility of Evidence and Standing in TTAB Proceedings
The Circuit dealt with two cases regarding the introduction and
admissibility of evidence and standing, reversing the Board in both
166
instances. In Cold War Museum Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum Inc., the
Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s decision in a cancellation battle
between two dueling museums specializing in Cold War artifacts.
Francis Gary Powers, Jr. sought and received registration of the mark
THE COLD WAR MUSEUM in connection with museum services,
pursuant to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, by submitting evidence
167
that his descriptive mark had acquired distinctiveness.
In the course of prosecuting the application, Mr. Powers submitted
a record of over 200 pages of material to support his claim that his
mark had become distinctive through substantially exclusive and
168
continuous use in commerce for, at least, the previous five years.
Three years after Mr. Powers’s mark was registered, Cold War Air
Museum Inc. moved to cancel Mr. Powers’s mark, arguing that the
mark was merely descriptive or generic for museum services, and
169
therefore, registration was permitted in error.
Mr. Powers argued
that the Trademark Office had evaluated the evidence of acquired
distinctiveness proffered during prosecution and that the mark had
170
been approved for registration with a section 2(f) claim.
Accordingly, he asserted that the registered mark should be
165. Id. at 1363–64, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310–11. Judge Newman seems to
argue that the Office should have read the services more liberally or allowed Aycock
to amend the recitation in order to keep the registration from being cancelled.
166. 586 F.3d 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
167. Id. at 1354, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. Section 2 of the Lanham Act states
that nothing prevents an applicant from registering a distinctive mark of the
applicant’s goods in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). 37 C.F.R. § 2.41(b) lists
three types of evidence that an applicant may use to establish the requirements of
distinctiveness as defined in the governing statute: (1) A claim of ownership of one
or more prior registrations on the Principal Register of the same mark for goods or
services that are the same as or related to those named in the pending application;
(2) A statement verified by the applicant that the mark has become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods or services by reason of substantially exclusive and continuous use
in commerce by the applicant for the five years before the date when the claim of
distinctiveness is made; (3) Actual evidence of acquired distinctiveness.
168. Cold War, 586 F.3d at 1355, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
169. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
170. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
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171

presumed valid. Although the Board acknowledged that the issue
of acquired distinctiveness had been raised and resolved in the
Registrant’s favor during the application process, the Board faulted
Mr. Powers for not resubmitting the evidence proffered during
172
prosecution during the cancellation proceedings. The Board used
this failure to resubmit evidence as a basis to exclude the evidence of
173
acquired distinctiveness altogether.
Having excluded the only
evidence Mr. Powers had provided, the Board asserted that
Mr. Powers had not met his burden, found in favor of the petitioner
174
museum, and cancelled “The Cold War Museum” mark.
The Circuit was decidedly chilly to the Board’s Cold War decision.
First, the court attacked the Board’s decision to ignore the ample
evidence of acquired distinctiveness in the application file.
They pointed to the “clear” and “unambiguous” nature of governing
statute 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b) regarding the treatment of application
175
files:
The file . . . of each registration against which a petition . . . for
cancellation is filed forms part of the record and the proceeding
without any action by the parties and reference may be made to the
176
file for any relevant and competent purpose.

Accordingly, the Circuit stated, the Board had no excuse for
excluding the evidence, as the statute makes clear that Mr. Powers
did not have to submit any additional evidence to ensure that the
Board would consider his submissions in support of his acquired
177
distinctiveness claim.
Next, the court examined the Board’s treatment of the
distinctiveness issue. According to the Circuit, the Cold War Air
Museum was so focused on the descriptiveness of the Registrant’s mark
that they did not adequately address Mr. Powers’s claim of acquired
171. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
172. Id. at 1355–56, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627–28.
173. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627–28.
174. Id. at 1356, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627–28.
175. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628.
176. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628.
177. Id. at 1357, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628–29. The Board attempted to draw a
distinction between the application file, without defining what they considered an
“application file” to be comprised of, and filings made subsequent to the initial
application but during the course of prosecution of the applied-for mark. In support
of this distinction, the Board cited its decision in an opposition proceeding,
British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Corp., No. 80,900, 1993 WL 409141, at *1, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 6, 1993), which the Board claimed had been
“affirmed” by the Federal Circuit in Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d
1527, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Circuit denied ever affirming
any Board finding on evidentiary issues or distinctiveness in British Seagull. Cold War,
586 F.3d at 1357 n.4, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 n.4.
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178

distinctiveness.
However, Mr. Powers, by submitting a claim of
acquired distinctiveness, had already acknowledged that his mark is
179
descriptive. The court faulted the Board for failing to identify the
Air Museum’s conflation of the descriptiveness and distinctiveness
180
issues.
Finally, the court rebuked the Board on the “less than precise”
discussion of the shifting burdens contained within a cancellation
proceeding, noting that the movant in a cancellation proceeding
must first evidence a prima facie case that the registration is invalid,
in the instant case, that the applied-for mark had not acquired
181
distinctiveness. If a prima facie case is shown, then, and only then,
does the Registrant have a burden to produce additional evidentiary
182
support to defend the registration.
Similarly, in rendering its
ultimate decision in a cancellation proceeding, the Board must
determine whether the petitioner has satisfied the burden of
persuasion that the mark was registered in error based on all the
evidence of record, both from the application file and information
183
made of record during the course of the cancellation action.
Here, the court determined that the Board erred in its analysis in
several ways: first, in incorrectly finding a prima facie case where the
Air Museum did not address acquired distinctiveness; second, in
superimposing on the Registrant a duty not found in the statute to
re-proffer evidence of acquired distinctiveness; and finally, in
184
concluding that the Air Museum had met its burden of persuasion.
The court reversed the Board’s decision, finding that the Board erred

178. Id. at 1358, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“Air Museum failed to present any
evidence whatsoever relating to the distinctiveness of the mark.”).
179. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“Where an applicant seeks registration
on the basis of a Section 2(f) claim, the mark’s descriptiveness is a nonissue;
an applicant’s reliance on Section 2(f) during prosecution presumes that the mark is
descriptive.”)
180. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“Air Museum failed even to argue that the
mark had not acquired distinctiveness. Instead Air Museum’s arguments and
evidence related exclusively to the mark’s descriptiveness, which . . . is irrelevant to
the validity of a Section 2(f) registration. Because Air Museum failed to even argue
the issue of acquired distinctiveness in its petition for cancellation, it failed to rebut
the registration’s presumption of validity. Therefore, the Board erred as a matter of
law in concluding that Air Museum had established a prima facie case that the mark
had not acquired distinctiveness.”) Id.
181. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1629 (“Given Air Museum’s failure to rebut the
registration’s presumption of validity, the Board also erred as a matter of law in
shifting the ‘burden’ to the Cold War Museum.”).
182. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (“In a cancellation proceeding, unlike
an opposition, the registration has a presumption of validity.” (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1057(b) (2006))).
183. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
184. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629–30.
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as a matter of law in concluding that the Air Museum established a
prima facie case that the registered mark had not acquired
185
distinctiveness.
186
In the next case, Bishop v. Flournoy,
Applicant Flournoy
sought
registration
of
the
marks
“100%
ART”
and
ONEHUNDREDPERCENT ART in connection with International
Class 16 goods, including, inter alia, paintings and printed
187
informational cards in the field of art.
Bishop, an artist, opposed
both applications, arguing that he had standing to oppose Flournoy’s
applications, that he had priority of use over Flournoy, and that
Flournoy had committed fraud on the Trademark Office in
188
prosecuting her applications.
He attached evidence to his notices
189
of opposition.
Flournoy argued that Bishop had not established any right to relief,
though she acknowledged that she had known that Bishop was using
190
both marks in connection with his artwork.
Bishop, representing
himself, did not properly introduce evidence during the period for
taking testimony. Instead, Bishop attached evidence to his trial
191
192
briefs.
Flournoy did not submit a response.
Bishop then filed
reply briefs arguing that the Board should grant judgment in his
193
The Board
favor because Flournoy had not briefed the TTAB.
refused to consider either the evidence attached to his notices of
194
opposition
or his trial briefs because the evidence was not
195
submitted at the proper phase of the opposition proceeding.
In addition, the Board found that Bishop had not proven his
196
standing or pleaded any ground for relief.
Bishop appealed to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
197
§ 1295(a)(4)(B).
The Circuit reviewed the standing and legal
198
The court noted that in a cancellation
determinations de novo.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.
319 F. App’x. 897 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 898.
Id.
The TTAB consolidated the two opposition proceedings. Id.
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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199

petition, a movant need only evidence a reasonable belief that he
200
will be damaged by the registration of the mark. According to the
201
The Circuit found
Circuit, this “is not a rigorous requirement.”
that Flournoy’s admission that she knew Bishop was using the
applied-for marks in connection with his artwork constituted
202
statements against interest.
While acknowledging that Bishop’s
evidence was properly excluded by the Board, the Circuit asserted
that Flournoy’s admissions against interest may have established
203
“standing and fraud or likelihood of confusion.”
Accordingly, the
Circuit remanded to the TTAB to determine whether Flournoy’s
204
admissions satisfied Bishop’s burden of proof.
B. Res Judicata
The Circuit decided two trademark appeals involving res judicata.
205
In American Rice, Inc. v. Dunmore Properties S.A,. the Circuit agreed
with the Board that American Rice’s cancellations claims were
precluded under res judicata. In 1982, American Rice, Inc. (“ARI”),
one of the largest rice millers in the United States, registered the
mark “ABU BINT” in the United States for use in connection with
206
rice. ABU BINT translates from Arabic into English as “Father of a
207
In 2002, Dunmore registered “BINT ALARAB,” or “Arab’s
Girl.”
208
girl,” in connection with rice. In 2003, ARI moved for cancellation
of the BINT ALARAB mark based on trademark infringement, as well
209
as trademark dilution, of its ABU BINT mark. Before the discovery
period in the 2003 cancellation proceedings ended, ARI withdrew its
210
petition for cancellation.
Because ARI had withdrawn its petition
without Dunmore’s consent, the TTAB dismissed ARI’s petition with
211
prejudice in 2004.

199. Of course, this was an opposition proceeding, not a cancellation proceeding.
Presumably, the standard should be the same for an opposition proceeding given
that registered marks have the presumption of validity. Id.
200. Id. at 900 (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
201. Id.
202. See id. (“[S]tatements in pleadings may have evidentiary value as admissions
against interest by the party that made them.” (quoting T.B.M.P. § 704.06(a))).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25467 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2009) (per curiam).
206. Id. at *1.
207. Id. at *2 n.1.
208. Id. at *1.
209. Id. at *2.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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In 2007, ARI filed a new petition for cancellation of the BINT
ALARAB mark, again alleging trade confusion and trademark
212
dilution. Dunmore subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
213
that ARI’s petition was barred by res judicata.
On appeal to the
TTAB, the Board treated Dunmore’s motion as a motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that Dunmore’s motion relied on
matters outside the 2007 pleadings, such as the Board’s 2004
214
dismissal order.
Possibly attempting to avoid the res judicata claim, ARI amended
its cancellation petition to include a claim that Dunmore had
committed fraud on the Trademark Office during prosecution of its
BINT ALARAB application and requested time to conduct discovery
215
on its claims. The Board denied ARI’s motion for time to conduct
discovery and granted Dunmore’s motion for summary judgment in
216
217
2009. ARI subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The court reviewed de novo the Board’s finding of res judicata and
its ruling on Dunmore’s summary judgment; the court also reviewed
for abuse of discretion the Board’s denial of ARI’s motion for time to
218
conduct discovery.
Res judicata refers to related legal concepts: claim preclusion and
219
Claim preclusion provides that a party cannot
issue preclusion.
newly litigate a matter if a court determined that the matter should
220
have been raised in earlier litigation, but was not. Issue preclusion
bars a party from litigating a matter if the matter has been litigated
221
and decided previously.
In the case at bar, ARI’s petition for
cancellation was never actually litigated and decided; thus, claim
222
preclusion is the basis for Dunmore’s res judicata defense.
The test for claim preclusion, as articulated by the Circuit,
precludes a claim when: (1) the parties are identical; (2) “there was
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *2–3.
215. Id. at *3.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, CH. 3, INTRODUCTORY
NOTE (1982)).
220. Id. (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129–30 (1983) (noting that
claim preclusion also bars the bringing of “any other admissible matter” which might
have been brought in the original action).
221. See id. (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 2002) (describing issue
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, as “the effect of foreclosing relitigation
of matters that have once been litigated and decided”)).
222. Id. at *4–5.
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earlier final judgment on the merits of the claim”; and (3) the new
223
claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first.
Neither ARI nor Dunmore contested that the parties were the same
as in the 2004 cancellation action or that the Board had dismissed
224
ARI’s petition with prejudice.
The only issue the Circuit had to
decide on appeal was whether the 2007 petition for cancellation on
grounds of trade confusion, trademark dilution, and fraud was based
225
on the same set of transactional facts as ARI’s 2003 petition.
ARI argued that its new petition for cancellation necessarily would be
based on material facts that occurred post-2003, but that it needed
226
additional discovery to fully uncover these new material facts. ARI
further argued that it is Dunmore’s burden, not ARI’s, to prove that
227
no new facts had occurred since the dismissal of the 2003 petition.
The Circuit noted that ARI’s 2007 petition was almost identical to
its 2003 petition. Accordingly, the court found that there was
nothing to suggest that the 2007 petition was based on facts outside
228
the transactional facts contained in the 2003 petition.
The court
was unfazed by the fraud claim, which was new to the 2007 petition,
noting that ARI was alleging that Dunmore had committed fraud in
229
2000 and 2001 during the BINT ALARAB application process.
The Circuit held that the fraud allegations were also claim-precluded
because the alleged fraud could have been raised in the 2003
230
cancellation petition.
Finally, regarding the motion for time for additional discovery, the
Circuit held that ARI’s motion for discovery was misplaced. ARI was
not seeking discovery to obtain facts to refute the res judicata claim
231
but rather to bolster its 2007 petition.
Accordingly, the Circuit
ruled that the Board did not err in either denying the motion for
time to conduct discovery or finding that the 2007 petition was
232
barred by res judicata.
223. Id. at *5 (Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1362,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1854, 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at *5–6.
226. Id. at *6.
227. Id.
228. See id. (“ARI’s 2007 Petition is, with the exception of a single minor,
nonmaterial word change, identical to its 2003 Petition . . . [and] paragraphs 1–10
and 18–23 of ARI’s amended 2007 Amended Petition are identical to the paragraphs
of the 2007 Petition and, with again a single nonmaterial exception, likewise
identical to those of the 2003 Petition.”).
229. Id. at *7.
230. Id. at *7–8.
231. Id. at *8–10.
232. Id. at *10.
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233

In Holt’s Co. v. Virgin Enterprises Ltd., the Circuit affirmed the
TTAB’s holding without opinion. Holt’s Co. had applied to register
the mark ASHTON VIRGIN SUN GROWN—in standard characters—
234
in connection with cigars. Virgin Enterprises opposed registration
on grounds of likelihood of confusion and trademark dilution with
Virgin Enterprises’ thirty-eight previously registered VIRGIN marks
235
for sundry goods and services. Although Holt’s Co. denied Virgin
Enterprises’ allegations, Virgin moved for summary judgment by
arguing that—due to the Board’s prior decision in a related case—
claim preclusion and res judicata barred Holt’s Co.’s ASHTON
236
VIRGIN SUN GROWN mark from registration based on.
Specifically, Holt’s Co. had previously sought registration for
ASHTON CABINET VSG VIRGIN SUN GROWN and the associated
237
design. Virgin opposed registration, and Holt’s Co. did not file an
238
239
answer. The Board entered a default judgment in Virgin’s favor.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Virgin argued that
Holt’s Co.’s application for ASHTON VIRGIN SUN GROWN was
based on the same transactional facts as its previous ASHTON
CABINET VSG VIRGIN SUN GROWN and associated design
application because the parties to the previous opposition were the
same, the goods were the same, and the marks were legally
240
identical.
Holt’s Co. countered that because the current appliedfor mark and their dismissed applied-for mark are not identical—the
wording is different and the dismissed application was for a design
mark—unique separate transactional or operative facts exist in the
241
242
current application
such that res judicata could not apply.
The Board’s analysis revolved around the commonalities between
Holt’s Co. applied-for mark and the drawing in the dismissed
243
application.
Specifically, the Board cited Institut National Des

233. 309 F. App’x 412, 2009 WL 279054, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2009) (per
curiam).
234. Virgin Enter. Ltd. v. Holt’s Co., No. 91176609, 2008 WL 885888, at *1.
(T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2009).
235. Id.
236. Id. at *1, *3. Given that the TTAB issued a default judgment, no claims were
litigated or decided in the prior Board decision.
237. Id. at *1.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *2.
241. Id.
242. Id. Holt’s Co. also argued that res judicata should not preclude their claim
because their previous “out-sourced” counsel made them do it. The Board did not
address this claim. Id.
243. Id. at *3.
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244

Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp. for the proposition that
the Board must determine whether the commercial impression of a
mark is the same as the mark involved in the current proceeding to
determine whether or not the res judicata claim preclusion doctrine
245
is triggered.
In Holt’s Co., the Board asserted that Holt’s Co.’s ASHTON VIRGIN
SUN GROWN mark had evolved from the ASHTON CABINET VSG
VIRGIN SUN GROWN and associated design mark and that the
deletion of the design element and the literal matter CABINET VSG
were minor alterations that did not sufficiently change the
246
commercial impression of Holt’s Co.’s mark to allow registration.
Accordingly, the Board granted Virgin’s summary judgment motion
and denied registration of the ASHTON VIRGIN SUN GROWN
247
mark.
C. Contract Estoppel in Opposition Proceedings
248

In Cipriani Group, Inc. v. Orient-Express Hotels Inc., the Circuit
249
upheld the Board’s decision without opinion. Cipriani Group filed
applications for CIPRIANI in connection with real estate and food250
related services.
Orient-Express Hotels Inc. and Hotel Cipriani
S.r.l. separately opposed registration, arguing that Cipriani Group’s
application was barred by a previously executed settlement
agreement and the likelihood of confusion with previously registered
251
(Orient-Express) and common-law (Hotel Cipriani) trademarks.
Cipriani Group countered that the settlement agreement did not
preclude registration of its CIPRIANI mark and asserted unclean
252
hands as an affirmative defense.
The Board consolidated the
separate opposition proceedings, and the opposers subsequently
253
moved for summary judgment.
The Board looked to the plain
language of the settlement agreement, which provided that
“[applicant] may conduct any business it chooses to engage in,
provided that it is designated . . . as CIPRIANI with the identity of the
244. No. 97417, 1998 WL 650076, at *1, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1894 (T.T.A.B.
1998).
245. Holt’s Co., 2008 WL 885888, at *3.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *4.
248. 331 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
249. Id.
250. Orient-Express Hotels Inc. v. Cipriani Group, No. 91176217, 2008 WL
2385984, at *1 (T.T.A.B. May 27, 2008), aff’d, 331 F. App’x 749 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
251. Id. at *1.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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product or service offered or any other descriptive terms or name
254
except use of the word HOTEL in connection therewith.”
The Board found that this language barred registration of Cipriani
Group’s CIPRIANI mark because the settlement agreement forbade
Cipriani Group’s use of the mark CIPRIANI without additional literal
255
matter.
The Board briefly addressed Cipriani Group’s unclean hands
defense, which centered around Orient-Express Hotels Inc. and
Hotel Cipriani S.r.l.’s use and registration of CIPRIANI marks outside
the United States and their actions to prevent Cipriani Group from
using marks containing CIPRIANI with or without additional literal
256
matter outside the United States.
Because the settlement
agreement was silent as to use or registration by either Cipriani
Group or Orient-Express Hotels Inc. and Hotel Cipriani S.r.l. outside
the United States, the Board found that Cipriani Group had not
257
proved its affirmative defense of unclean hands.
D. Failure to Prosecute
258

In Mc.Zeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., McZeal, doing business as
International Walkie Talkie, brought suit against Sprint Nextel and
Nextel Communications in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, alleging, among other claims, patent and trademark
259
infringement. Specifically, International Walkie Talkie alleged that
Sprint and Nextel had infringed his service mark registration
for “INTERNATIONAL WALKIE TALKIE,” U.S. Registration
260
No. 3,016,449. McZeal represented himself as International Walkie
261
Talkie in the Texas court proceedings. During the first stage of the
infringement proceedings, the Southern District of Texas dismissed
International Walkie Talkie’s case for failure to state a claim upon
262
which relief could be granted and for want of prosecution.
The Federal Circuit initially found that International Walkie Talkie
254. Id. at *2.
255. Cipriani, 2008 WL 2385984, at *4.
256. See id. (“On its face, the [settlement] agreement does not address actions
taken by opposers outside the United States”).
257. Id. at *4–5. Having disposed of the contract estoppel claim and the unclean
hands defense, the Board did not address the opposers’ claims of likelihood of
confusion and the adequacy of Cipriani Group’s specimens of record, though it
noted that alleged error on the part of the Trademark Office—i.e., accepting
insufficient specimens—is not proper grounds for an opposition. Id. at *5.
258. 335 F. App’x 966, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (McZeal II).
259. Id. at 966–67.
260. Id. at 967.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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had stated enough of a claim to survive Sprint’s summary judgment
motion, and vacated and remanded the case back to the district court
to allow International Walkie Talkie the opportunity for discovery on
263
the nature of Sprint’s allegedly infringing electronics device.
The district judge voiced her disdain for the Circuit’s decision to
vacate her order and remand the case. In oral argument, the district
judge asserted that she was “actually comfortable simply holding the
same way [she] held last time,” called the Circuit’s decision to
remand and vacate “absurd,” and deemed that the Circuit’s order
264
“[did] not run to the rational faculties.”
In order to speed up the proceedings, the district court ordered
International Walkie Talkie to provide a list of all websites used by
International Walkie Talkie from 2005–2008 and a precise
description of “how, when, and where” it had used its International
265
Walkie Talkie mark. Sprint was required to provide the “extent and
timings of all uses by Sprint Nextel” of the International Walkie
266
Talkie mark.
McZeal, still pro se on behalf of International Walkie Talkie, did not
comply with the district court’s order and showed up late to his next
267
scheduled hearing in March 2009. At the hearing, the district court
chastised International Walkie Talkie (and the Federal Circuit),
saying “[b]ecause I was obliged by a gross error in the Court of
Appeals to readdress this case, I did. I asked you [International
Walkie Talkie] to do a few fairly straightforward, simple things that
would have helped Sprint understand what you thought you were
268
doing.”
Finding that International Walkie Talkie had “produced
nothing,” “failed to respond to inquiries by defense counsel,” and
“did not appear at the hearing,” the district court issued a dismissal
order based on both International Walkie Talkie’s purported failure
to state a claim and want of prosecution, i.e., not complying with the
269
Court’s production order.
Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit did not take kindly to the
district court’s unfettered criticism. The Circuit found that Texas
judge had improperly dismissed International Walkie Talkie’s case
based on a failure to state a claim, “disregarding [the Federal
263. Id.; McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1358–59, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d
1315, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (McZeal I).
264. McZeal II, 335 F. App’x at 967.
265. Id. at 968.
266. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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270

Circuit’s] prior mandate.” However, the Circuit found that Texas’s
dismissal of International Walkie Talkie’s claim for want of
prosecution did not constitute an abuse of discretion given
271
International Walkie Talkie’s “contumacious conduct” comprising
violations of multiple orders and its failure to timely attend the
272
March 2009 hearing.
The Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of
273
International Walkie Talkie’s case for want of prosecution.
E. Common Law Rights
274

In Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding Inc., the Federal Circuit upheld
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s finding of
275
no trademark infringement.
This case stems from alleged patent and trademark infringement
of one of the legendary home appliance manufacturer’s blender
276
models, the VITA-MIX 5000.
Basic Holding markets several
277
competitor blenders, including the BLENDER SOLUTIONS 5000.
Vita-Mix registered VITA-MIX in connection with “electric food
processors and electric food blenders for domestic and commercial
278
use.”
It had never attempted to register the VITA-MIX mark with
279
On appeal, Vita-Max argued that its
the numeric matter “5000.”
common law rights in the “5000” numeric matter had been infringed
280
by Basic’s BLENDER SOLUTIONS 5000.
In order to analyze whether Vita-Mix’s common law rights had
been infringed, the Circuit first had to determine whether Vita-Max
281
actually had common law protection as to “5000.” Vita-Mix had the

270. See id. at 968 (citing Briggs v. Pa. R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948) (noting
“an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by
an appellate court”)).
271. Id. at 969. The district court noted that International Walkie Talkie had filed
thirteen civil actions and six bankruptcies, all of which were ultimately dismissed for
failure to state a claim or for want of prosecution. Id. at 968.
272. Id. at 969–70.
273. Id. at 970.
274. 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
275. Id. at 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
276. Id. at 1320–21, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342–43.
277. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
278. U.S. Registration No. 2021896 (Dec. 10, 1996).
279. Vita-Mix, 581 F.3d at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. Nor has Vita-Mix
tried to trademark any of its other products with numeric names, e.g., the
“VITA-MIX 3600,” the “VITA-MIX 4500,” or the “VITA-MIX 5200.” Id. at 1330,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
280. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
281. Id. at 1329–30, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
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burden of proving that “5000” was inherently distinctive or had
282
acquired secondary protection.
It is a well-established principle in trademark law that model
numbers—i.e., numbers that serve as grade designations rather than
283
as source-indicators—are generally not protectable as trademarks.
Here, Vita-Mix admitted that it does not use the “5000” matter in
commerce other than as VITA-MIX 5000 and “that the number 5000
functions only to distinguish the blender from previous Vita-Mix
284
[blenders] on the market.”
The Circuit therefore concluded that
Vita-Mix had no trademark rights in the “5000” literal matter to be
285
protected from infringement.
The Circuit went further to state
that, like Vita-Mix, Basic had not used “5000” in a trademark sense
either. The court noted that Basic’s website referred to “5000” as a
model number, and Basic’s product packaging for its “Blender
286
Solutions” did not mention “5000” in the product name.
Vita-Mix argued that they were not required to show either that
they had a valid trademark mark in “5000” or that Basic had used the
287
“5000” in a source-indicating sense. Instead, Vita-Mix argued that it
only had to prove that a likelihood of confusion had occurred
288
between their 5000 “mark” and Basic’s 5000 “mark.”
The Circuit
quickly shredded this argument, opining, “Vita-Mix is incorrect as a
matter of law” and “[w]ithout a protected trademark use, Vita-Mix
cannot make a prima facie case of trademark infringement as a
289
matter of law.”

282. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
283. See In re Dana Corp., No. 655454, 1989 WL 274389, at *1, *3, *12, U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1748, 1748–49 (T.T.A.B. July 19, 1989) (holding that “5-469X” was
unregistrable for universal joint couplings and the evidence was insufficient to
establish distinctiveness and thus recognition as a mark); cf. In re Petersen Mfg. Co.,
1986 WL 83664, at *2–3, 229 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 466, 468 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 1986)
(noting that some model designations can, through use and promotion, also be
perceived as marks indicating origin).
284. Vita-Mix, 581 F.3d at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
285. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350. The court noted that “5000” refers to the
wattage of the blender. Id. at 1331, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
286. Id. at 1331, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350. Basic contended that the “5000”
corresponded to a suggested price for the product, i.e., $50.00. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1350.
287. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
288. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
289. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1350.
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F. Statements of Use
290

In In re Sones, the Circuit vacated the TTAB’s decision upholding
the Trademark Office’s refusal to register based on an insufficient
291
specimen of use in commerce.
Michael Sones submitted an intent-to-use application for the mark
ONE NATION UNDER GOD in connection with “charity
292
bracelets.”
After the mark had been published for public
opposition, Sones submitted a Statement of Use with attendant
specimens in the form of two web pages that indicate that
TM
“ONE NATION UNDER GOD ” charity bracelets could be added to
293
a virtual shopping cart and purchased for two dollars each.
294
However, the web pages did not display any picture of the bracelets.
The Trademark Office refused registration, citing sections
904.06(a)–(b) of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure
(TMEP), which provides that catalogs or similar specimens, such as a
display, associated with the offered goods “include[] a picture of the
295
The Office invited Sones to submit a substitute
relevant goods.”
alternative specimen that included a picture of the Applicant’s goods
296
along with the mark, which Sones did not do.
The Board upheld
the Office’s refusal, noting that Sones’s specimens did not offer a
297
photograph of the mark displayed with a picture of the goods.
Sones appealed to the Circuit, asserting that the Trademark Office
had improperly exacted a “bright-line rule” that specimens of use
298
comprising website images must include a picture of the goods.
The court proclaimed that it could “see no reason why websites must
necessarily have pictures to associate a trademark with the goods
299
being sold.”
The Circuit noted that the Trademark Office’s
photograph requirement for web-based specimens of use seemed to

290. 590 F.3d 1282, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
291. Id. at 1289, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
292. Id. at 1283, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
293. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119–20.
294. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
295. Id. at 1284–85, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
296. Id. at 1283–84, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
297. Id. at 1284, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. Sones decided not to submit a
substitute specimen, one assumes, because he did not possess a specimen that
included the actual bracelets prior to his Statement of Use filing date. On the same
day that the Board ruled against his application, Sones filed a use-based application
for the mark “ONE NATION UNDER GOD” for “charity bracelets” and submitted a
picture of the bracelets next to the word ONE NATION UNDER GOD with relevant
ordering information. This time, however, Sones listed his first use date as January
23, 2008. Id. at n.2, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
298. Id. at 1284, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
299. Id. at 1288, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
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be borne of the Office’s misunderstanding of Lands’ End, Inc. v.
300
Manbeck.
In Lands’ End, the district court analyzed a specimen of use for the
301
mark “KETCH” in connection with purses.
Lands’ End, the mail
order clothing company, submitted a specimen comprised of a page
of its catalog that showed a picture of a purse, a description of the
302
purse, and displayed the applied-for mark. The Lands’ End district
court found that this specimen was an acceptable specimen of use
because it constituted a point of sale display of the mark in
303
connection with the goods in question.
The district court
specifically noted that it was finding that the KETCH specimen was a
point of sale display because “Lands’ End’s use of the term KETCH—
with the picture of the purse and corresponding description—
constitutes a display associated with the goods,” and further noted
that the catalog pages included both a photograph and description of
304
the goods.
Inspired by the district court’s Lands’ End decision, the Trademark
Office rewrote its TMEP to include sections discussing requirements
305
for catalogs.
The Trademark Office stated that an Applicant’s
catalog will qualify as a valid specimen of use if: “(1) it includes a
picture of the relevant goods, (2) it includes the mark sufficiently
near the picture of the goods . . . , and (3) it includes information
necessary to order the goods.” For a catalog to qualify as a valid
specimen of use, the Office required the Applicant to: (1) “include a
picture of the relevant goods;” (2) [“show] the mark sufficiently near
306
the picture of the goods;” and (3) include ordering information.
The Circuit asserted that the Board’s photograph requirement had
307
“no basis in trademark statue or policy.”
Accordingly, it held that
“the test for an acceptable website-based specimen, just as any other
specimen, is simply that it must in some way evince that the mark is
308
‘associated’ with the goods and serves as an indicator of source.”
The Circuit asserted that in making this determination, the Office
should consider whether the web pages in the application “have a
‘point of sale nature’ . . . and whether the . . . inherent characteristics
300. Id. at 1285, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121 (citing Lands’ End, Inc. v.
Manbeck, 797 F. Supp. 511, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (E.D. Va. 1992)).
301. 797 F. Supp. at 512, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
302. Id. at 513, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
303. Id. at 514, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
304. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
305. In re Sones, 590 F.3d at 1285, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
306. Id. at 1285–86, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
307. Id. at 1287, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
308. Id. at 1288, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
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of the goods are recognizable from the textual description”
309
Accordingly, the Circuit vacated and remanded back to
provided.
310
the Board to reconsider Sones’s specimen of use.
CONCLUSION
2009 signified a year of pruning back against what the Circuit
seemed to feel was overreaching by lower tribunals, particularly as to
311
the TTAB. The court issued nine precedential decisions.
For the
trademark bar, it was a banner year at the Circuit, with the court
raising the standard for finding fraud on the Trademark Office in
312
Bose, mandating that the Office hold proportionality paramount in
313
foreign equivalent determinations in Spirits, and lowering the
314
standard for web-based specimens for goods in Sones.

309. Id. at 1289, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. The Federal Circuit noted that
“charity bracelet” is listed in the Trademark Officer’s Acceptable Identification of
Goods and Services Manual and seemed to suggest that the usage of this term meant
that the Applicant need not provide any additional language in order to constitute a
point of sale, even in the absence of a photograph of the goods. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1124 (stating “the more standard the product, the less comprehensive the textual
description need be”).
310. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. Federal Circuit Judge Newman dissented
from the decision, asserting that the appeal should have been dismissed as moot
because of Sones’s second application for the ONE NATION UNDER GOD mark.
Id. at 1289–90, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124–25 (Newman, J., dissenting). Newman
asserted that the Circuit’s decision was but “an elaborate opinion [] on a non-issue
for an absent controversy[,]” because Sones’s second application “complied” with the
Office’s photograph requirement. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. The majority
felt this second application did not moot the appeal because the second application
provided a later constructive use date. Id. at 1289 n.1, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1124–25.
311. In re Sones, No. 2009–1140, 2009 WL 5085349, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118
(Fed. Cir. 2009); In re 1800Mattress.com IP LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1682 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Cold War Museum v. Cold War Air Museum Inc.,
586 F.3d 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic
Holding Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bose Corp.,
580 F.3d 1240, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hotels.com L.P.,
573 F.3d 1300, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Shinnecock Smoke
Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Spirits Int’l,
N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Aycock Eng’g, Inc.
v. Airflite, Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
312. See supra Part I.A.I (discussing the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the TTAB’s
decision).
313. See supra Part I.B.I (discussing the Federal Circuit’s reversal and remand of
the TTAB’s decision).
314. See supra Part II.F.I (discussing the Federal Circuit’s vacating and remanding
the TTAB’s decision).

